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Abstract 
The present paper will focus on the legal aspects of State responsibility, as a 
consequence of internationally wrongful acts resulting from the military use of artificial 
intelligence (AI). The first part will serve as a contextualization of the current stage of AI and its 
conceivable utility within the future of warfare. In this section, we will draw special attention to 
the development of autonomous weapon systems (AWS) and its potential impact in existing legal 
frameworks in matters of the responsibility of States. For this purpose, the following chapters will 
serve as a qualitative analysis through which the theory of the responsibility of States will be 
firstly synthesized, to then continue reflecting on its possible application in a case study about 
AWS. The analysis will focus on the ‘General Rules on State Responsibility for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts’ as laid down in the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts adopted by the International Law Commission, by examining the criteria for the 
emergence of an internationally wrongful act of the State, that is, first the breach of an 
international obligation of the State and then the attribution of such behaviour to said State. The 
criteria will be addressed in this very order, contrary to the sequencing of the Draft Articles, due 
to the particularly complex interaction between the rules of attribution and AWS. However, it 
will not be the aim of this paper, to carry out an exhaustive study about the multiple sources of 
international obligations of States nor the full content of the Draft Articles. On the other hand, it 
will also not be the objective, to delve into the discussions regarding the qualification of 
individual criminal responsibility. The analysis will ultimately stick to three elected substantive 
areas of international law, i.e., the ius ad bellum, the ius in bello and International Human Rights 
Law (IHRL), which may have a direct bearing on the legality of the use of AWS.  
Hence, this thesis will primarily address the question about the applicability of international law, 
more concretely the General Rules on State Responsibility, to internationally wrongful acts 
derived from the State use of AWS.  
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 1 
A. Introduction 
 
Throughout history, technological advances have provided a crucial tactical 
military advantage to those who have developed them: the invention of gunpowder in 
the Middle Ages, the steam engine in the 16th century, the automobile and electric 
power in the 20th century, the airplane, the rocket and, the splitting of the atom between 
1900 and 19451. Up until relatively recently, military force was only effective under the 
centralized control of a State; in the modern era, however, with the advent of 
decentralized telecommunications technologies such as the Internet, that is no longer the 
case; these new technologies, when harnessed to their full potential, transcend the limits 
of traditional geographical and political borders. These technologies have given rise to 
new paradigms of warfare, which are constantly being updated, revised, and expanded 
as new advances are made. Experts have coined a general term to describe this tendency 
within modern warfare; namely, the “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA)2. The rise 
of RMA has led to new challenges within both the military and national security 
sectors; the result is a clear divide between developed countries, in possession of more 
technologically sophisticated weapon systems, and developing countries, which have 
generally been unable to keep pace, e.g. the U.S. forces in Afghanistan against the 
Taliban in 20013. This exponential acceleration of technological systems fosters the 
emergence of new systematic risks and transcendental transformations with the 
potential to compromise the resilience of our current scientific and legal paradigms, 
assuming these are not developed and adapted accordingly.  
Today, a new military technology announces the emergence of a new arms 
race. As the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), Russia, China, South 
Korea, and Israel4 begin to study the potential of fully autonomous military systems, a 
tendency can be observed, in which the international community is increasingly 
showing an interest in exploring artificial intelligence (AI) for national security 
 
1BUCHANAN, R. A., ‘History of Technology’. In: Encyclopaedia Britannica [online], 2019.  
2  SINGER, W., Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, Ithaca, Cornell 
University, 2003, pp. 49-63.  
3 FRENCH, P. electronic source: War Machines of Afghanistan analysis: Army Technology, 2009-, 
accessed: 24.11.19. Available at: https://www.army-technology.com/features/feature50591/.  
4  GARCÍA, ECATERINA, The Artificial Intelligence Race: U.S., China and Russia. In: Modern 
Diplomacy online: Science and Technology, 2018.  
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 2 
purposes5. This race for AI dominance embodies what some scholars already call “the 
third revolution of war”6. AI impregnates our daily lives in numerous subtle ways, 
performing tasks that originally could only be performed by humans with highly 
specialised knowledge, expensive training, or a government-issued license. 
Autonomous machines can execute complex financial operations, perform document 
review, drive cars, enable less invasive surgical operations and identify potential 
terrorist group members by using facial recognition software; hence bringing many 
potential benefits for society7.  
Before continuing with the present thesis, a definition for AI as a premise is 
needed. AI pioneer John McCarthy stated that there is no “solid definition of 
intelligence that doesn’t depend on relating it to human intelligence” 8, therefore every 
attempt at defining AI has focused on interconnected human characteristics such as self-
awareness, language use, and the ability to learn, adapt and reason. A purely goal-
oriented approach would be a metaphysical question rather than a legal one, whereas a 
definition centred on rationality, poses the risk of being too broad for the purposes of 
this paper. AI programs that act rationally may not pose a public risk while others that 
do not act in said manner may pose serious public risks - if the lack of rationality 
hinders the legislator’s ability to predict the program’s actions. Therefore, this paper 
will stick to the definition coined by Mathew U. Scherer, which is based on a legal 
perspective: “artificial intelligence refers to machines that are capable of performing 
tasks that, if performed by a human, would be said to require intelligence”9. Regarding 
the current state of technology development, it can be said that the current phase is 
dominated by what is known as narrow AI, i.e. reduced AI designed to perform a set of 
specific tasks. However, the goal of some State-led military-industrial projects, such as 
 
5  RODRIGUEZ ALVAREZ, J., in: MARTINEZ QUIRANTE, R. and RODRIGUEZ ALVAREZ, J. 
(eds.), Inteligencia artificial y armas letales autonómicas”: un nuevo reto para Naciones Unidas, Gijón, 
Ediciones Trea, 2018, p. 18.  
6 Id., p. 9.  
7 RoboLaw online: Regulating Emerging Robotic Technologies in Europe: Robotics facing Law and 
Ethics collaborative project: FP7-SiS-Challenge 1-3: Regulating emerging scientific and technological 
developments, 2014-, accessed: 25.11.19. Available at: www.robolaw.eu.  
8 McCARTHEY, J., ‘What is Artificial Intelligence?’. In: Formal Reasoning Group [online]. [United 
States] : Computer Science Department, Stanford University, 2007, November-12-2007. 
9 SCHERER, M. U., “Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges, Competences, and 
Strategies”, Harvard Journal of Law & Technology, Vol. 29, 2016, num.2, pp. 359-362. 
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 3 
the ‘US Defense Advanced Research Project Agency’ (DARPA)10 is to reach the so-
called artificial general intelligence11. The latter would be distinguished by its ability to 
perform a set of cognitive tasks matching or even surpassing humans (superintelligence) 
without significant human intervention (human-out-of-the-loop)12. As can already be 
seen today in the example of search engines and spam filters among others, 
technological systems solve problems and learn by using different algorithms in a 
process known as deep learning13. This consists of a statistical process that begins with 
a variety of data, provided by the manufacturer, and attempts to foster a derivation of 
specific rules or patterns, from the machine’s side, that strive to explain the provided 
data and try to predict future data. Hence, the machine could reach certain associations 
on the basis of such initially introduced data that serves as its core to operate within 
given real life situations.  
The controversy begins with AI as a national security defence mechanism, 
which has "license to kill"14. This may apply to the latest advances in war technology 
under the term of autonomous weapon systems (AWS) and its use in e.g. DARPA’s 
Collaborative Operations in Denied Environments (CODE) 15  or aiming Target 
Recognition and Adaption in Contested Environments (TRACE) 16  with “minimal 
human commands”. There is no internationally agreed upon definition of AWS, but for 
the purpose of this thesis the definition provided by the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) suffices: “Any weapon system with autonomy in its critical 
functions – that is, a weapon system that can select (search for, detect, identify, track or 
select) and attack (use of force against, neutralize, damage or destroy) targets without 
human intervention”. According to views expressed in the ICRC Expert Meeting on 
 
10 DARPA, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. Program Information. In: DARPA Homepage 
online. Virginia. 
11 RODRIGUEZ ALVAREZ, J. op. cit. note 5, p. 44.  
12 UNGARN-STERNBERG, A., Artificial Agents and General Principles of Law. In: German Yearbook 
of International Law online. Trier: University of Trier, 2018, pp. 1-22. 
13 SCHARRE, P., Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War, New York/London, W. 
W. Northon &Company, 2018, pp. 11-20.  
14 RODRIGUEZ ALVAREZ, J., op. cit. note 5., pp. 41-51. 
15 DARPA, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. News and Events. In: DARPA Homepage 
online. Virginia: CODE Demonstrates Autonomy and Collaboration with Minimal Human Commands, 
19.11.2018. 
16 DARPA, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. Program Information. In: DARPA Homepage 
online. Virginia: Target Recognition and Adaption in Contested Environments (TRACE). 
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 4 
AWS in 2014, these are perceived to grant several advantages in the military field17. 
For example, they are expected to sense and process information more quickly; 
increase the flexibility, speed and precision of decision-making processes and targeting 
of combatants; and lead to outcomes that are, overall, less harmful due to the lack of 
human emotions in the battlefield - such as self-interest or vengeance. But most 
importantly, AWS would be able to undertake dangerous tasks in adverse environments 
and would therefore spare lives of human combatants. On the other hand, AWS are also 
perceived as potential threats to the value of human life and dignity, since decisions to 
attack would ultimately be taken by machines. The potential for the uncontrolled 
proliferation of these systems and the possibility for malfunctions are among the main 
concerns of the experts18. Additionally, according to Heather M. Roff, the use of AWS 
could represent the next stage in the RMA; serving to increase asymmetrical practices 
in armed conflicts between robots and humans. The party that deploys AWS reduces 
the risks they must take to achieve military objectives, whereas the real risks of death 
and injury still remain for human combatants and civilians. Finally, a debate also exists 
concerning the possibility of an increased number of armed conflicts by means of 
AWS, which coincides with a decrease in the likelihood of peaceful settlements and 
negotiation between belligerent States if the human substrate is removed19.  
Responsibility for such intelligence(s) becomes a particularly complex matter 
due to the burgeoning nature of this kind of technology and the subsequent absence of 
specific legal paradigms. The main argument raised against the use of AWS is that it 
would be affected by the so-called “accountability gap”20. Autonomy sceptics cite two 
fundamental problems. On the one hand, the inherent complexity of AWS and the fact 
that (as any human) they will never be completely flawless means an eventual breach of 
international law is inevitable 21 . On the other hand, the almost endless list of 
 
17 ICRC. Autonomous weapon systems: technical, military, legal and humanitarian aspects, Report of the 
ICRC Expert Meeting, 26-28 March 2014, Geneva.  
18  WEIZMANN, N. Intrenational debate and state practice, in: WEIZMANN, N. and COSTAS 
TRASCASAS, M. (eds.), Autonomous Weapon Systems under International Law, Academy Briefing No. 
8, Geneva Academy of international humanitarian law and Human Rights, 2014, p. 4-5.   
19  ROFF, H. M., “Lethal Autonomous Weapons and Jus Ad Bellum Proportionality”, Case Western 
Reserve Journal of International Law, Vol. 47, 2015, iss. 1, p. 44-48.  
20 CROOTOF, R., War Torts: Accountability for Autonomous Weapons. In: University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review online: 2016, Vol. 164, No. 6, p. 1366. 
21  SCHARRE, P., Autonomous Weapons and Operational Risk online. Washington D. C.: Ethical 
Autonomy Project, 2016, p. 25.     
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 5 
potentially responsible individuals, including, inter alia, software programmers, 
military personnel, weapons reviewers, and political leaders, creates difficulty in 
assigning responsibility22. Campaigns like Stop Killer Robots23 advocate a total ban on 
AI for military use primarily due to the alleged lack of legislation regarding State 
liability in that aspect. On the other hand, governments and international organisations 
(IO) have also made attempts to keep up with the new emerging technologies, including 
the ICRC24; The Human Rights Watch25; the EU, with its recently published European 
Coordinated Plan on Artificial Intelligence (2018)26; and the United Nations (UN). The 
latter is playing a key role as a conditioning agent vis-à-vis States with its new open-
ended Group of Governmental Experts on emerging technologies in the area of lethal 
autonomous weapons systems out of its fifth Review Conference of the High 
Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)27. 
This paper will aim to clarify the issue of international responsibility by 
examining the applicability of the International Law Commission´s (ILC) Draft articles 
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (hereinafter “ILC-
Articles”)28 to violations of international law committed prima facie by an AWS. The 
analysis begins with section “A”, which serves as an introduction to the topic. The 
‘general rules on the responsibility of States’ are addressed in section “B”, where an 
 
22 AMOROSO, D. Jus in bello and jus ad bellum arguments against autonomy in weapons systems: A re-
appraisal. In: QIL online. Italy: International Law Department, University of Cagliari, 2017, pp. 5-31.  
23 Campaign to Stop Killer Robots. The Threat of Fully Autonomous Weapons. In: Campaign to Stop 
Killer Robots Homepage [online], 2020 [accessed: 24 November 2019]. Available at: 
https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/learn/.  
24 ICRC: Views of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on autonomous weapon system. 
Report: Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Meeting of Experts on Lethal 
Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) 11-15 April 2016, Geneva, 2016-, accessed: 24 November 
2019. Available at: https://www.icrc.org/en/document/views-icrc-autonomous-weapon-system.  
25  Human Rights Watch: Loosing Humanity: The Case against Killer Robots. Legal clinic: The 
International Human Rights Clinic (IHRC) at Harvard Law School, 2012-, [accessed: 24 November. 
2019]. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/arms1112_ForUpload.pdf.  
26  European Commission, Coordinated Plan on Artificial Intelligence, Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, The European Council, The Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Brussels, December 2018 (COM(2018) 795 
final).  
27 2019 Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) online:  
Report of the 2019 session of the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area 
of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems: Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of 
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects, 2019. 
28 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, Doc. UN/A/56/49 (Vol. I) Corr. 4: UNITED NATIONS, The Work of the International Law 
Commission, New York, Vol. 1, 8th Ed., 2012, pp. 204-2014.  
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 6 
overview is provided both of the legal nature of the ILC-Articles and of the specific 
chapters that will be most relevant for the purpose of this paper, namely; the rules to 
state the existence of a breach of an international obligation and the rules of attribution 
of a conduct to a State. This theoretical framework will subsequently be applied to a 
‘case study about the military use of Autonomous Weapon Systems’ discussed in 
section “C” of this paper. This section is divided into four subsections; the first 
subsection addresses the question of ‘possible breaches of substantial rules of 
International Law’, which aims to provide an analysis of the potential infringement of 
the three selected International Law domains, i.e. ius ad bellum, ius in bello, and 
International Human Rights Law, by the deployment of AWS. The second subsection 
deals with questions of ‘accountability for internationally wrongful acts resulting from 
the State use of AWS’. Within this subsection, the responsibility regime applicable to 
state agents recognized in the ILC-Articles will be discussed and these will then be 
contrasted against the applicable regime to international organizations of which the 
States in question are members. The third subsection discusses the ‘responsibility for 
breaches of collective obligations’, which, in turn, raises the existing differences 
between erga omnes and erga omnes partes obligations, and exposes the aggravated 
responsibility regime applicable to ‘serious breaches of obligations under peremptory 
norms’. The fourth and final subsection explores ‘the role of international judicial 
bodies’ by proposing the International Court of Justice as a potential international forum 
to deal with cases of international responsibility associated to the State use of AWS. 
Section “D” completes the analysis carried out in this study by means of a conclusion 
that aims to serve both as a summary and as a way forward. 
 
B. General Rules on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts  
 
Before any analysis, it is necessary to establish a theoretical framework for this 
study. The following will serve as an examination of the applicable provisions of the 
ILC’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility as a premise to subsequently answer the 
main question about responsibility for internationally wrongful acts arising from State 
use of AWS.  
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 7 
The International Law Commission (ILC) approved the Draft articles on Responsibility 
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (hereinafter “ILC-Articles”) in 2001. Despite 
being an instrument of ‘soft-law’ and of subsidiary legal nature, the ILC-Articles are not 
deprived of normative value 29. The draft was conceived as a general legal framework 
applicable to cases of international responsibility of States in which, inter alia, there are 
no special norms applicable (Article 55 ILC-Articles)30. Furthermore, the ILC-Articles 
must also be applied in eternal concordance with the Charter of the Unite Nations 
(UNC) (Article 59)31. 
An internationally wrongful act is the result of certain behaviour attributable to 
a State consisting of an action or omission that constitutes a violation of an international 
obligation in force of that State32. The fundamental principle in the matter is that 
“every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of 
that State” (Article 1 ILC-Articles). It is a principle that has been widely used in 
international jurisprudence and is considered of customary nature33. The ILC opted for 
the term “international obligations”, since they are characterized by their subjective 
character, because these obligations are due to another State (or States) or to the entire 
international community as a whole. The inevitable consequence of a State violating 
their obligations is international responsibility, without entering into questions of 
validity or enforceability. The qualification of a certain behaviour of a State as an 
internationally wrongful act depends exclusively on international law and not on the 
internal law of States (Article 3 ILC-Articles).  
 
Chapter II defines the circumstances under which the attribution under Article 
2 ILC-Articles is justified, i.e., when behaviour based on an action or omission or a 
series of actions or omissions is to be considered as State behaviour. The attribution of a 
behaviour to the State as a subject of international law is based on criteria determined 
by international law and not on the simple recognition of a natural causal relationship. 
 
29  CASANOVAS, O., “La Responsabilidad Internacional del Estado”, in: CASANOVAS, O. and 
RODRIGO, A. J. (eds.), Compendio de Derecho Internacional Público, Madrid, Editorial Tecnos, 2019, 
pp. 541-543.  
30 Id., pp. 541-542 
31 Id., p. 542.  
32 CRAWFORD, J., Los artículos de la Comisión de Derecho Internacional sobre la Responsabilidad 
Internacional del Estado: introducción, texto y comentarios, Madrid, Dykinson, 2004, pp. 115-119.  
33 CASANOVAS, O., “La Responsabilidad Internacional del Estado”, op. cit., note 29, p. 543.  
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 8 
In an analytical operation, attribution is to be (mentally) treated as a separate concept 
from the overall qualification of “internationally wrongful act”. Its purpose is to 
determine that there is in fact an act of the State for the purposes of responsibility. 
Proving that certain behaviour is attributable to the State says nothing, per se, about the 
legality or illegality of that behaviour.  
The second constitutive element of an internationally wrongful act requires that 
the behaviour attributable to a State actually constitutes a violation of an international 
obligation (Article 2b) ILC-Articles). A violation of an international obligation consists 
in the conduct of a State that “is not in conformity with what is required of it by that 
obligation, regardless of its origin or character” (Article 12 ILC-Articles). An element 
that determines the existence of a violation of an international obligation is the 
temporary factor, which means that the obligation has to be in force for the State in the 
moment of infringement (Article 13 ILC-Articles). It is nevertheless always a question 
conditioned by the type and content of the substantive international obligations and the 
specific context in which it occurs.  
Finally, Chapter III contains the special regime applicable to serious breaches 
of obligations under peremptory norms of general international law. For the purposes of 
responsibility of States, these are obligations to the international community as a whole 
where all States have a legitimate interest in their protection. The derived obligations 
and interests are, thus, opposable to the whole international community (erga omnes). 
The legal consequences of serious violations are regulated in Article 41 of the ILC-
Articles, which requires that States must actively cooperate to put an end to the breach   
and must also refrain from recognising a situation “within the meaning of Article 40” as 
lawful (discussed below)34. 
 
C. State Responsibility and Artificial Intelligence: Case Study 
about the Military Use of Autonomous Weapon Systems 
 
 
34 See Article 41 para. 2 ILC-Articles. 
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 9 
The ethical and legal implications of the development and use of weapon 
systems capable of detecting, identifying, and subsequently neutralizing a specific 
target as a result of a decision-making process wholly without significant human 
intervention are gaining the attention of the international community, especially in view 
of recent events, in which States like the US have allegedly been involved in attacks 
perpetrated by remote controlled unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) against Afghan 
civilians35. A similar situation could be seen in Pakistan, between 2004 and 201436, and 
another perhaps more latent example, is the one concerning the 2020 targeted US drone 
strike against Iranian military general Soleimani37. In the event, that such cross border 
attacks are caused by conventional remote-controlled drones, it appears, in principle, to 
be an effortless task to analyse possible violations of international law based on the 
decision-making process of a human remote pilot. However, with increasing autonomy, 
there is a well-founded expectation that a time will come when UAVs will select and 
pursue targets without human control (as discussed below), leaving life-and-death 
decisions entirely to computer-controlled processes. This paper focuses on the potential 
shift towards self-piloting, autonomous UAVs; when applied to the Soleimani case, the 
removal of a human pilot from the equation would raise a series of questions regarding 
the existence of an internationally wrongful act and who (or what) to hold responsible 
for the actions of this form of AWS.  
This chapter will therefore serve as an examination of the possible applications 
of the aforementioned general rules on State responsibility to the specific case of State 
use of AWS, as in the examples highlighted above. The reason behind the choice of this 
specific type of AI is twofold; firstly, the development and commercialisation of 
unmanned defence Mini-drones (swarms) is already on the national security agenda of 
multiple States 38 ; and secondly, there is an objectively high probability that such 
 
35  BAÑOS, J. J.. Un dron de EE.UU. mata por error a cuarenta jornaleros en Afganistán. In: La 
Vanguardia online, 2019. 
36 HEYNS, C., AKANDE, D., HILL-CAWTHORNE, L. and CHENGETA, T. The international law 
framework regulating the use of armed drones. In: Cambridge University Press online. United 
Kingdom: British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2016. Vol. 65, Issue 4, pp. 791-827.  
37 MARCUS, J., “Qasem Soleimani: por qué EE.UU. mató al general de Irán ahora (y qué es lo que se 
espera que ocurra)”. In: BBC News Mundo online, 03.01.2020 accessed: 21.01.2020. Available at: 
https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-internacional-50983463.  
38 RODRIQUEZ, J., MOJAL, X., FONT, T. and BRUNET, P. online : Novel Weapons against Ethics 
and People, Armed Drones and Autonomous Drones report. Centre Delàs d’Estudis per la Pau, 2019. 
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devices may be involved in international law controversies if States begin to use them 
regularly in the military field (as already seen in the cases involving US-drones39).  
 
 
I. Possible breaches of international obligations of States  
In order to identify the existence of internationally wrongful acts by States 
using AI, the requisite of the ILC-Articles regarding the breach of an international 
obligation of the State will first be analysed. The source of States’ international 
obligations may vary, however, this paper will stick to the study of three substantive 
areas of international law, which may have a direct bearing on the legality of the use of 
AWS: the law governing the use of force by one State on another State’s territory – ius 
ad bellum -, international humanitarian law – ius in bello –, and IHRL.  
 
 
1. Ius ad bellum 
In light of the aforementioned concerns, it is important to summarise ius ad 
bellum anew, which governs the use of force between States. The basic provision of the 
ius ad bellum is contained in Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations (UNC)40, 
which encompasses the prohibition on the use or threat of inter-State force. Article 2(4) 
UNC counts as the codification of the peremptory norm of customary origin that limits 
the use of force between States, from which State obligations towards the entire 
international community (erga omnes) derive41. The employment of any armed force in 
the territory of a foreign State, without its previous consent, shall be considered a 
violation of Article 2(4) UNC unless the two given exceptions apply42: authorisation by 
the UN Security Council (SC) and the exercise of the inherent right of States to 
individual or collective self-defence (Article 51 UNC)43.  
 
39 Id.  
40 SCHWARTMANN, R., Völker- und Europarecht, Heidelberg, C.F. Müller, 10th ed., 2015, p. 6. 
41 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI.  
42 AMOROSO, D. Jus in bello and jus ad bellum arguments against autonomy in weapons systems, op. 
cit., note 22, pp. 5-31.  
43BERBER, F., Lehrbuch des Völkerrechts/ 2. Kriegsrecht, Munich, Beck, 3rd ed., 1969, p. 41. 
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For a correct understanding of the concept of use of force in the sense of 
Article 2(4) UNC, it has to be interpreted in light of the essential values and purposes of 
the Charter as a whole and, particularly, in relation to its preamble and Article 51. On 
the one hand, it is understood that not all kinds of confrontation are included in the ban, 
but only armed or military force attributable to a State (questions of attribution 
discussed below)44. On the other hand, with regard to the means of war to be used, the 
UNC covers both weapons and conventional military forces directed against a foreign 
territory. However, the list of war methods is not exhaustive, so it should be noted that 
the terms “armed” and “military” in the UNC can refer to a broad conception of force45. 
In principle, the provision reflects a prohibition on any war methods capable of 
producing effects comparable to traditional weapons, i.e. the occurrence of human 
injury or death and/or serious property damage46. Looking back to the deaths caused by 
cross-border drone strikes helps in understanding why autonomous UAVs could be 
categorized as lethal war methods as long as they produce the mentioned effects. Their 
use could cause the breach of the international obligation of States to detain from the 
threat or use of force against each other.  
Regarding the concept of threat of force, Article 2(4) UNC also includes acts 
that may jeopardize the values of the Charter before an effective deployment of armed 
forces.  Following the thought of some scholars, the mere ownership or development of 
AWS could compromise the objectives of the UNC to eliminate any threat to 
‘international peace and security’47. As stated in the 1984 Declaration on the Right of 
Peoples to Peace, the aim of the legal regime of international peace and security consists 
in ensuring that “the policies of States are directed towards the elimination of the 
threat of war”48. Broadly understood, this could very well include an evaluation of 
national policies allowing the use of AWS due to their potential lethality. Nevertheless, 
as could be seen with the example of nuclear weapons in 199649, the International Court 
 
44  HEINTSCHEL VON HEINEGG, W. in: EPPING, V., HEINTSCHEL VON HEINEGG, W. and 
IPSEN, K. (eds.), Völkerrecht, Munich, Ein Studienbuch, 7th ed., 2018, pp. 1138-1139 (18). 
45 Id.  
46 BERBER, F., op. cit., note 44.  
47 AMOROSO, D. Jus in bello and jus ad bellum arguments against autonomy in weapons systems, op. 
cit., note 22. pp. 5-31. 
48 Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace, (A/RES/39/11) November 12, 1984, para. 3.   
49 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ GL No 95, Report 226, ICGJ 
205, ICJ 1996. 
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of Justice (ICJ) opts for a purpose-oriented interpretation of threat, closely linked to the 
effective use of force, in that it applies parameters based on its hypothetical legality (or 
illegality). A threat of force will be unlawful on a case-by-case basis, if the specific 
behaviour that sustains said threat could be considered a violation of Article 2(4) UNC 
once put into practice 50 . Applied to the case at hand, the mere possession or 
development of AWS would not be reason enough to qualify as a threat contrary to 
international law, even if they had the potential of causing human injury, death, or 
serious property damage. Hypothetically however, if State A were to develop AWS 
with the clear intent to direct it against State B, it could be considered as an unlawful 
threat and would subsequently qualify as an unjustified use of force if finally put into 
practice, as long as the aforementioned exceptions did not apply. The intention of these 
practices is therefore crucial to the determination of threat, i.e. these systems should not 
be developed with the sole intention of causing an inter-State conflict51.  
As such, it can be concluded that States should (at least theoretically) be 
entitled to use AWS under the umbrella of self-defence (Article 51 UNC) against a 
previous armed attack by another State52. It will therefore be vital to determine if and 
when said armed attack takes place when deciding to use UAVs against the alleged 
aggressor. In this regard, Article 2 of the Resolution on the Definition of Aggression53 
defines the first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the UNC as "prima 
facie evidence of an act of aggression". This will ultimately be determined by the SC 
(Article 39 UNC) in attention to the specific circumstances of each case. This implies 
that, while every use of force against the territorial integrity of another State is 
prohibited, not every such use of force will constitute an armed attack that justifies the 
use of autonomous drones. In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ affirmed “it will be necessary 
to distinguish the most grave forms of the use of force [armed attack] from other less 
grave forms [e.g. ‘mere frontier’ incidents]”54. Although the Preamble of the Resolution 
 
50 KÖTTER, W., Atomwaffeneinsatz ist völkerrechtswiedrig. In: AG Friedensforschung online. 8 July 
2006. 
51Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among 
States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, (A/RES/2625 (XXV)) 24 October 1970. 
52 HEYNS, C., AKANDE, D., HILL-CAWTHORNE, L. and CHENGETA, T., op. cit., note 37, pp. 791-
827. 
53 Definition of Aggression (UNGA Res. 3314 (XXIX)), 14 December 1974.  
54 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America), 
Merits, Reports, ICJ 1986. 
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considers aggression “the most serious and dangerous form of the illegal use of force”, 
the ICJ nevertheless refers to armed attack as “the most grave form of the use of 
force”55. However, both sources implicitly suggest the possibility of first attacks that do 
not constitute a violation of the UNC, if the acts or concrete consequences are not of 
sufficient gravity56. This is especially relevant if the first use of armed force is through 
AWS as an early defence against the confirmed launch of a long-range projectile. In this 
case, the first use of force could be justified in the face of an imminent threat. The 
concept of imminence is a question that goes beyond the scope of this analysis, 
nevertheless there seems to be a clear response from the side of the UN, following the 
Secretary General’s report which makes clear that States can take military action as long 
as the threatened attack is imminent, no other means would deflect it, and the action is 
proportionate57. The State could thus make use of its inherent right to “self-help”58 by 
deploying defence UAVs without failing its obligations under Article 2(4) UNC, 
provided the SC is duly informed and confirms said state of imminent threat.  
Article 51 UNC expressly stipulates the obligation of States to inform the SC 
of any self-defence measures adopted against another State. The notion of self-defence 
is therefore the first step within the two-phase system of the modern ius ad bellum, in 
which it is left to the State’s discretion, whether it deploys autonomous UAVs in 
another State’s territory. This process is preliminary to the last revision phase, in which 
the SC must assess the legality of the measures taken by the State concerned according 
to the principles described above. In this sense, the non-delivery of such notice alone 
would not necessarily result in an internationally wrongful act, especially if the Council 
subsequently views the adopted measures as justified.  Nevertheless, “the absence of a 
report may be one of the factors indicating whether the State in question was itself 
convinced that it was acting in self-defence”59. Additionally, such an omission could 
compromise the transparency required by the Council and the justification owed to the 
 
55 IRMAKKESEN, The Notion of Armed Attack under the UN Charter and the Notion of International 
Armed Conflict – Interrelated or Distinct?, Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and 
Human Rights, 2014, pp. 4-5.  
56 CASANOVAS, O., “Noción de Ataque Armado”, op. cit., note 29, pp. 434-435.  
57 Report of the High-Level Panel Established by the UN Secretary-General (December 2004), A/59/565 
(2004).  
58  DINSTEIN, Y., War, Aggression and Self-Defence, DePaul University, Cambridge/ Chicago, 
Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 175. 
59 ICJ, Nicaragua v United States, op. cit. note 55.  
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international community60. The SC itself therefore represents a limit to the States’ right 
to self-defence. As such, States will have to contemplate this when planning to use 
AWS and still fulfil their obligations vis-à-vis the rest of the international community.   
   
2. Ius in bello 
Having reviewed the main aspects around whether and when to use AWS as a 
weapon of force in a foreign territory, this section will analyse how said force may be 
used through the second relevant key body of international law, namely, International 
Humanitarian Law.  
Whether a strike by an AWS is regulated by IHL will depend on whether said 
situation takes place in an international or a non-international armed conflict. If a drone 
strike did not take place within the context of an armed conflict, IHL would give way to 
International Human Rights Law, which would exclusively govern the use of lethal 
force (discussed below)61. On the other hand, unlike ius ad bellum, ius in bello is 
primarily addressed to human beings rather than to the territorial integrity of a sovereign 
State as a whole. While the principal subjects of IHL are still States, rules on the 
conduct of hostilities – i.e. the rules of distinction, proportionality, military necessity, 
precautions in attack and, to a certain extent, the Martens Clause - are addressed at 
belligerents who plan, decide upon, and carry out an attack, by creating specific 
obligations that must be respected so as to avoid being held accountable for violations62. 
In order to fall under the inter-State spectrum, said violations will have to consist of 
conduct attributable to a State under specific circumstances (discussed in the following 
chapter), and must also fulfil the “objective element of responsibility of being 
unlawful” 63 . In the case at hand, this translates as the infringement of concrete 
provisions of IHL by the State use of AWS.  
It is not the aim of the present paper to undertake an exhaustive analysis of all 
 
60 HEYNS, C., AKANDE, D., HILL-CAWTHRONE, L. and CHENGETA T. op. cit., note 37, p. 804.  
61 Id., p. 805.  
62 ICRC. Autonomous weapon systems: implications of increasing autonomy in the critical functions of 
weapons, report of the ICRC Expert Meeting, 15-16 March 2016, Geneva.  
63SASSOLI, M., State Responsibility for Violations of International Humanitarian Law. In: Cambridge 
University Press online: Intermational Review of the Red Cross, 2002, Vol. 84, Nº 846.  
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principles involved in IHL, therefore this segment shall limit itself to examining 
weapons law and the most relevant principles of targeting law for the use of AWS. 
These are the principles of distinction, proportionality, humanity and precautions in 
attack.  
 
a) Requirement to review new weapons 
Although IHL-treaties do not specifically regulate AWS, ensuring that any new 
weapon is capable of being used in accordance with IHL remains indispensable. Article 
36 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions 196964 (Protocol I) states:  
“In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or 
method of war, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine 
whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by 
its Protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable to the High 
Contracting Party”65. 
 The ICRC argues that all States, weather or not they are a party to Protocol I, 
have the obligation of conducting weapons reviews because “the faithful and 
responsible application of its international law obligations would require a State to 
ensure that the new weapons, means and methods of warfare it develops or acquires will 
not violate these obligations66”. The crux of the matter is whether a weapon’s design 
and function are intrinsically inconsistent with IHL rules. For a producing State, 
reviews will have to take place at an early stage of “technical development, and in any 
case before entering into the production contract”67. On the other hand, acquiring States 
will also have to ensure their compatibility with IHL before effective possession. The 
ICRC adds that “an existing weapon that is modified in a way that alters its function, or 
a weapon that has already passed a legal review but that is subsequently modified” 
 
64 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Protocol I), and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977. 
65 See Article 36 Protocol I 
66 ICRC, A Guide to the Legal Review of New Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare: Measures to 
Implement Article 36 of Additional Protocol I of 1977, Vol. 88, Nº 864, December 2006, Geneva. 
67 Id. 
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should be reviewed anew68. This is particularly relevant for AWS, since robots are 
generally complex systems that tend to combine different components and are 
constantly undergoing modifications.  
In order to determine whether a new or modified weapon, like an autonomous 
UAV, would be prohibited by IHL, its compatibility with the applicable treaties should 
be examined. It may be possible that new or modified UAVs contain components 
prohibited by international treaties, but, since there is still no provision that prohibits 
them in general terms, it is convenient to resort to customary law and, in particular, the 
principles of distinction (Article 51(4) Protocol I) and of prohibiting unnecessary 
suffering (Article 35(2) Protocol I). Both principles place emphasis on the weapon’s 
objective nature rather than on the subjective intention of potential users. According to 
the first principle, an autonomous UAV would be deemed indiscriminate in its 
manufacturing and/or programming, if it cannot distinguish civilians from specifically 
targeted combatants69. On the other hand, the common interpretation of the second rule, 
enshrined in Article 35(2) of Protocol I, is that “international law only forbids the use of 
weapons that increase suffering without really increasing military advantage”70. In that 
sense, a weapon is proscribed only if it is designed to cause injury or suffering that 
could otherwise be avoided, given the military constraints of the given situation. An 
example of an unlawful AWS under this rule would be one equipped with warheads 
filled with glass, since this complicates ex post medical treatment (unnecessary 
suffering).  
As such, the fact that AWS are programmed to autonomously decide which 
target to engage does not per se qualify as a violation of any of the mentioned 
principles. The requirement for a legal review, of Article 36 of Additional Protocol I, 
ensures that the weapon is not indiscriminate by default and that it would not cause 
unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury. All States will have to ensure that the AWS 
is equipped with sufficiently reliable data to ensure it can be aimed at a military 
 
68 Id.   
69 ANDERSON, K., Readings: Jeffrey S. Thurnher on Law of Armed Conflict Applied to Autonomous 
Weapon Systems. In: Lawfare online. Cyber & Technology, 2013.  
70 DINSTEIN, Y., The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, 5th ed., 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 57-61.  
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objective and that it is armed exclusively with permitted weapons and ammunition71. 
 
b) Principle of distinction  
Once deployed, AWS would have to comply with IHL rules of conduct in 
armed conflicts in order to avoid an internationally wrongful act. The rule of distinction 
is part of customary international law and is considered a norm of ius cogens72. For 
international armed conflicts, Protocol I requires armed forces to distinguish combatants 
from non-combatants, ensuring attacks are “limited strictly to military objectives”73. 
Similar provisions are to be found in the Additional Protocol to the Geneva 
Conventions (Protocol II) applicable to non-international conflicts74. Some treaties on 
conventional weapons also contain the rule of distinction prohibiting “the indiscriminate 
use of weapons” “against the civilian population as such or against individual 
civilians”75. The rule of distinction poses one of the greatest challenges to AWS because 
of four major reasons: technological limitations, the lack of precise definitions in IHL 
treaties, the intricate nature of today’s armed conflicts, and possible technical 
malfunctions in AWS 76 . An autonomous UAV must be able to process all the 
information necessary to distinguish between different target categories (combatants; 
potential members of an organized armed group) and/or specific conducts (direct 
participation in hostilities) that make a person a legitimate target 77 .  According to 
Sassóli, it is not a solution to use AWS only in an environment where no civilians could 
 
71 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, op. cit., note 50 ; TAKEMURA, H., Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles: Humanization from International Humanitarian Law. In: Wisconsin International Law 
online. University of Wisconsin, 2019. Vol. 32, Nº. 3, pp. 521-546. 
72 CHENGETA, T., Measuring Autonomous Weapon Systems against International Humanitarian Law 
Rules. In: Journal of Law and Ciber Warfare online: Harvard Law School; Midlands State University, 
Faculty of Law, 2016, Vol. 5, iss. 1(c), p. 76. 
73 See Article 48 Protocol I.  
74 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 13(2), June 8, 1977.  
75 Protocol II to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional 
Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects article 3(2), 
Oct. 10, 1980. 
76 CHENGETA, T., Measuring Autonomous Weapon Systems against International Humanitarian Law 
Rules, op. cit., note 73, p. 74.  
77  SASSOLI, M., Autonomous Weapons and International Humanitarian Law: Advantages, Open 
Technical Questions and Legal Issues to be Clarified. In: International Law Studies online: U.S. Naval 
War College, 2014, Vol. 90, Nº. 308, p. 319.   
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be endangered, since any (initially) legitimate target may surrender (hors de combat), 
ergo, become an illegitimate target78. 
 
As for military objects, Article 52(2) of Protocol I defines them as objects with 
an “effective contribution to military action” - the neutralization of which gives a 
belligerent a definite and real military advantage “in the circumstances ruling at the 
time”79. Therefore, an autonomous UAV’s decision to target a specific objective must 
be based on the assumption of “direct and tangible military advantage” excluding, e.g., 
objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population80. In contemporary armed 
conflicts, especially those that involve terrorist groups, civilians may willingly or 
unwillingly provide shields to combatants. Armed conflicts are brought to civilian 
dwellings where fighters (usually not wearing any distinctive uniform) seek cover in 
crowds where some civilians may even support them or directly take part in hostilities. 
In this confusing scenario, an AWS shall still be able to distinguish between “persons 
who are not part of States’ armed forces or who are not members of an armed group 
participating in an armed conflict” (civilians) and those who have lost their protection 
due to their supportive behaviour towards a particular group or State involved in 
hostilities (belligerents)81.  
It is not unreasonable to think that autonomous UAVs may be used in the war 
on terrorism, especially in view of the situation where remote controlled drones are 
currently the main weapons for that purpose82. The real difficulty for such systems lies 
in the methods for reliably identifying terrorists/combatants, which are further hindered 
by the secrecy of operations as well as uncertainty surrounding the moment when 
civilians, who supporting or directly participating in hostilities become legitimate 
targets83. 
 
c) Principle of proportionality 
 
78 Id.  
79 See Article 52 para. 2 Protocol I.  
80 See Article 54 Protocol II.   
81 ICRC. Rule 5. Definition of Civilians. In: IHL Database: Customary IHL online.  
82 See the examples mentioned above regarding news about US-drone strikes, p. 5.  
83 CHENGETA, T., Measuring Autonomous Weapon Systems against International Humanitarian Law 
Rules, op. cit., note 73, p. 83- 88.  
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This principle, which is codified in Article 51(5)(b) of Protocol I and in Article 
3(8) of Amended Protocol II to the Convention on CCW84, aims to prohibit attacks, 
which, even if directed at military objectives, “may be expected to cause incidental loss 
of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, 
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated”85. In order to determine the proportionality of a military operation, many 
factors must be taken into account on a case-by-case basis86 after “everything feasible 
has been done to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor 
civilian objects and are not subject to special protection” 87. In this sense, multiple 
civilian casualties may not be deemed disproportionate (collateral damage88) if the main 
target was a senior leader of the enemy forces, but at the same time, even a single 
civilian casualty may be excessive if the enemy soldiers killed were of little relevance 
or posed no threat89. A State’s deployment of an autonomous drone in an armed conflict 
will, therefore, be scrutinized in order determine whether the expected collateral 
damage was excessive compared to the anticipated military advantage of the strike, and 
whether those expectations were reasonable under the concrete circumstances 90 . 
However, some scholars already predict that the greatest difficulty for States using 
AWS will be linked to the evaluation of the anticipated military advantage rather than to 
the evaluation of risk to civilians 91 . After all, even when only human soldiers are 
involved, the “concrete and direct military advantage anticipated” from an attack on a 
legitimate target tends to change rapidly according to situational developments. A 
miscalculation or technical malfunction of the UAV could, in this sense, lead to 
disproportionate casualties and to a breach of the State’s obligations under IHL.  
 
84 Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as 
amended on 3 May 1996 (Protocol II as amended on 3 May 1996), art. 3, para. 8, May 3, 1996, 2048 
U.N.T.S. 133. 
85 See Article 51 para. 5 letter b Protocol I.  
86 Human Rights Watch (HRW). Losing Humanity: The Case against Killer Robots. In: Human Rights 
Watch Homepage online. International Human Rights Clinic, Human Rights Program at Harvard Law 
School, 2012.  
87 See Article 57 Protocol I and II.  
88 McNEAL, G. S., Targeted Killing and Accountability. In: The Georgetown Law Journal online, Vol. 
102:681, 2014, p. 740.  
89  SCHMITT, M. N.. Unmanned Combat Aircraft Systems And International Humanitarian Law: 
Simplifying The Oft Benighted Debate. In: Boston University International Law Journal online. Boston 
University, 2012. Vol. 30:595. 
90 Id.  
91 SASSOLI, M., Autonomous Weapons and International Humanitarian Law, op. cit., note 78, p. 332.  
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M.U. EN DIPLOMACIA Y ORGANIZACIONES INTERNACIONALES 
 
 
 20 
d) Principle of humanity 
AWS also raise concern among experts in relation to the principle of humanity 
enshrined in the Martens Clause, which prohibits weapons that run counter to the 
“dictates of public conscience”92. The clause originated at the 1899 and 1907 Hague 
Conventions, later codified in Article 1, para. 2 of Protocol I, which dictates:  
“In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, 
civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the 
principles of international law derived from established custom, from the 
principles of humanity and from dictates of public conscience.”93 
This residual provision is used in the event that a means of war does not 
expressly violate an existing treaty or customary law in order to sufficiently cover 
possible violations of the more general principles of humanity or the dictates of public 
conscience. As such, the principle is a universal reference point, aiming to prevent the 
assumption that “anything not explicitly prohibited is permitted”94. As was noted by the 
ICJ, the customary rule reflected in the Martens Clause “had proved to be an effective 
means of addressing rapid evolution of military technology”, which is crucial in the 
evaluation and governance of emerging weapon systems like AWS that tend to develop 
faster than international law95.  According to the principle of humanity, States should 
cease development and/or use of any weapons that fail to meet the legal-ethical 
requirements that it reflects. As mentioned in the introduction, there is an expectation 
that increasing autonomy will mean that AWS will select and pursue targets without any 
human input, leaving life-and-death decisions entirely to computer-controlled processes. 
. This may raise ethical questions regarding the responsibility of humans in the use of 
force and the taking of human life, which go beyond questions of IHL compliance in the 
 
92 ICRC, A Guide to the Legal Review of New Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare, op. cit., note 67, 
p. 17. 
93 See Article 1, para. 2 Protocol I: Hague Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land and its Annex, Regulation Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague Convention 
II), July 29, 1899: Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: 
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague Convention IV), October 18, 
1907.  
94 DAVISON, N., A legal perspective: Autonomous weapon systems under international humanitarian 
law. In: International Committee of the Red Cross Homepage [online]. Geneva: Arms Unit, Legal 
Division, 31 January 2018, p. 8.  
95 Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, op. cit., note 50, paras. 78, 84.  
CEI, Centro Adscrito a la Universitat de Barcelona       Nº 5/2020, 8 DE 
SEPTIEMBRE DE 2020 
COLECCIÓN TRABAJOS DE INVESTIGACIÓN DEL 
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conduct of hostilities96. In regards to public conscience, Robert Arkin conducted a 
public opinion survey, which included the relevant autonomous technology researchers, 
policymakers and military personnel97. The social survey revealed that confidence in 
autonomous systems is comparatively low, which is coupled with a general preference 
for weapons that include some type of human intervention in key target selection 
processes. Participants assured that “an autonomous robot [taking life] in both open 
warfare and covert operations is unacceptable”, mainly because of the fear that it could 
lead to uncontrolled collateral damage; civilian loss of life98. Even if such evidence does 
not create binding law, it does not preclude States’ responsibilities, e.g. conduct 
appropriate reviews of fully AWS that address and adjust to public concerns.   
 
e) Precautions in attack and the question of human control 
The concept of “meaningful human control” was amongst the key issues 
discussed at the 2014 UN CCW meeting 99. Some experts emphasised the need for 
measuring autonomy through the development of a system - based on objective criteria 
such as the “ability to perform pre-programmed tasks without further human action”100. 
In the absence of an internationally agreed upon definition of the concept of autonomy 
and the necessary degree of meaningful human control in order to comply with IHL, 
some scholars propose resorting to the principle of precautions in attack reflected in 
Article 57 of Protocol I. According to this principle, “those who plan or decide upon an 
attack shall take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack to 
spare the civilian population 101 ”. This principle reinforces the already discussed 
principle of distinction and confers a certain degree of discretion on the planning of an 
attack. In the case at hand, this translates into the act of deciding to use an autonomous 
UAV for a specific military operation. Since commanders are usually in charge of the 
ex-ante planning of rules of engagement, they would also most likely plan how and 
when to deploy a (intrinsically) licit AWS. Commanders would have to respond to the 
 
96 DAVISON, N., op. cit., note 97, pp. 8-9.  
97 ARKIN, R. C., Governing Lethal Behavior in Autonomous Robots, Florida, Taylor & Francis Group, 
2009, pp. 49-53.   
98 Human Rights Watch (HRW). Losing Humanity, op. cit.,,note 87, p. 36 
99 Chairperson of the Meeting of Experts, UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Report of 
the 2014 Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), para. 20.  
100 Id.  
101 See Article 57 para. 2 letter a (ii) Protocol I.  
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given circumstances reasonably and with good faith “on the basis of all information 
available to him/her at the relevant time”102, “in order to make sure that the objectives to 
be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects103”. Although it is possible that 
future AWS will facilitate an evaluation of the likelihood of harming civilian targets, 
the final decision to deploy that AWS for that specific occasion lies with the 
commander 104 . Even though the weapon’s precision and range are factors to be 
assessed, the principle of precautions in attack does not imply any prohibition of 
specific weapons 105 . It rather focuses on the decision-making process during the 
preliminary phase and the available information at that point regarding civilian 
presence. Even if fully AWSs, as defined throughout this study, are someday expected 
to engage targets autonomously and might therefore slightly deviate from the pre-
established operational plan, the legal standard will still focus on the reasonableness of 
the precautions taken106. Once deployed, there seems to be a broad consensus that the 
ideal that AWS should resemble must inevitably be the human being107. An autonomous 
UAV deployed within an on-going armed conflict will theoretically be compatible with 
IHL, if its response capacity is evaluated as comparable to that of a human being under 
the same conditions. The question then revolves around whether the autonomous system 
is able to act in a given case with feasible precautionary measures108 comparable to 
those a human soldier could have shown, on the assumption that “feasible” will always 
be what is in accordance with IHL109. Also, in a scenario where the only weapon 
available was an AWS, the commander could claim that, with the information 
possessed, there were no other feasible options at the time - even when causing great 
civilian casualties. Nothing would prevent, however, the application of other IHL 
criteria such as the proportionality rule mentioned above110. 
 
 
102 ANDERSON, K., Readings: Jeffrey S. Thurnher on Law of Armed Conflict Applied to Autonomous 
Weapon Systems. In: Lawfare online. Cyber & Technology, 2013. 
103 See Article 57 para. 2 letter a (i) Protocol I. 
104 McNEAL, G. S., op. cit., note 89, pp. 739-750.  
105 ICRC. Commentary of 1987: Precautions in attack. In: ICRC Homepage online], 8 June 1977, para. 
2201. 
106 ANDERSON, K., op. cit., note 103, pp. 404-405.  
107 SASSOLI, M., Autonomous Weapons and International Humanitarian Law, op cit., note 78, p. 319. 
108 See Article 57(2) (a) (i) Protocol I.  
109 SASSOLI, M., Autonomous Weapons and International Humanitarian Law op. cit., note 108. 
110 SCHARRE, P., op. cit., note 21, p. 258.  
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In conclusion, the debate about responsibility (or lack thereof) for violations of 
international obligations undoubtedly becomes more intricate once IHL is under 
scrutiny. IHL focuses mainly on the specific characteristics of a particular action within 
an on-going armed conflict. In this sense, nothing prevents a particular AWS strike that 
may have complied with the requirements of the ius ad bellum from failing to comply 
with IHL standards once an armed conflict originates. This is especially true in the case 
that said UAV autonomously deviates from the pre-established operational plan 
resulting from a re-assessment of the specific environment (deep learning)111. IHL, even 
if considered lex specialis112, can be conceived within the ILC-framework, in which it 
operates by filling gaps and modifying the general rules on State responsibility113. This 
can be observed in cases where the ILC has applied the ILC-Articles in order to 
attribute or not attribute certain infringements of IHL to a given State114. An AWS 
could, in principle, be capable of fulfilling all the conditions of targeting law as any 
other lawful weapon. The emergence of an internationally wrongful act will depend on 
when and how the weapon was used considering the pre-assessment of the concrete 
circumstances and the pre-programmed response. An example of precautionary 
measures can be seen during the travaux préparatoires of the Geneva Conventions of 
1949, where some delegates proposed that parties to a conflict should fit particularly 
dangerous weapons with safety devices “to render them harmless if they fell out of the 
control of the user”115.  
 
3. International Human Rights Law 
The final substantive area of international law that must be considered in 
assessing the legality of the State use of autonomous UAVs is International Human 
Rights Law. States and advocacy groups at the 2014 UN Convention on CCW already 
discussed the possible implications of AWS for IHRL and, in particular, for the right to 
 
111 RODRIGUEZ ALVAREZ, J. op. cit. note 5, p. 41-51. 
112 Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, op. cit., note 50, para. 25. 
113 SASSOLI, M., State Responsibility for Violations of International Humanitarian law, op. cit., note 64, 
pp. 403-404.  
114 ICJ, Nicaragua v United States, op. cit. note 55.  
115 Commentary of 1987, op. cit., note 106.  
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M.U. EN DIPLOMACIA Y ORGANIZACIONES INTERNACIONALES 
 
 
 24 
life, to human dignity, to be protected against inhuman treatment, and to a fair trial116. 
There seems to be a general consensus regarding the particularity of the impact that 
AWS could have on the right to life if these are eventually programmed to 
autonomously select and neutralize targets. It is under IHRL that the right to life is most 
expressly protected, as set out in different international and regional human rights 
treaties117; inter alia, the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 
1976 (ICCPR)118, the American Convention on Human Rights of 1978 (ACHR)119, the 
1970 European Convention for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR)120, 
as well as implicit references to human rights in humanitarian law treaties121. Individual 
human rights (including the right to life), enshrined in the aforementioned treaties, are 
seen as inherent to human nature, since the UN General Assembly (GA) proclaimed the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 “as a common standard of achievement 
for all peoples and all nations” 122 . Although it lacks binding force, it represents a 
“shared legal opinion of the international community” regarding the universality of the 
rights and obligations listed therein123. In principle, IHRL is designed to apply at all 
times, including situations of armed conflict124. However, this assumption is heatedly 
discussed in State practice; many countries fear that the simultaneous application of 
humanitarian and human rights law in the event of armed conflict would heavily restrict 
and curtail their armed forces. In this sense, it is undisputed that States may take 
measures to temporarily suspend their human rights obligations in case of war or other 
public emergency threatening their security only to the extent, and for such time, as may 
be necessary to prevent serious injury and to facilitate adjustment125. While the ECHR 
 
116 Chairperson of the Meeting of Experts, op. cit., note 100. 
117 HEYNS, C., AKANDE, D., HILL-CAWTHRONE, L. and CHENGETA T. op. cit., note 37, p. 818.  
118 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted and opened for signature, ratification and 
accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 entry into force 23 March 
1976, in accordance with Article 49, Article 4 para. 1. 
119 American Convention on Human Rights, Organization of American States, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. 
No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, entered into force July 18, 1978, Article 27, para. 1.  
120 European Convention on Human Rights of 21 September 1970 as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 
14 supplemented by Protocols Nos. 1, 4, 6, 7, 12, 13 and 16, Article 15, para. 1.    
121 See Preamble Protocol II, Article 51, para. 1, and Article 72 Protocol I.  
122 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN General Assembly Resolution 217 A, 10 December 
1948, Art. 3.  
123 MELZER, N., Human Rights Implications of the usage of Drones and Unmanned Robots in Warfare 
[online]. Homepage for the European Parliament. Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, 
Policy Department, p. 18. 
124 Id., p. 14.  
125 Id., p. 15.  
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M.U. EN DIPLOMACIA Y ORGANIZACIONES INTERNACIONALES 
 
 
 25 
protects the right to life by a prohibition of “intentional” deprivations of life without 
prejudice of “lawful acts of war”126, the ACHR and the ICCPR prohibit “arbitrary” 
deprivations of life with no apparent exceptions127. This means that the permissibility of 
lethal force ultimately depends on what is considered to be “arbitrary”. Under IHRL any 
use of force has to be necessary, i.e. it has to be the least harmful measure to reach the 
legitimate objective of protecting life128. As with IHL, necessity will be assessed on a 
factual basis and depending on the different available options in a given situation 
involving the use of AWS. Force must also be proportionate, i.e “the potential harm in 
using force [shall] not outweigh the legitimate protective goal pursued”129.  At this point 
it is relevant to differentiate the proportionality principle of IHL and proportionality in 
terms of IHRL; in IHRL, intentionally lethal or potentially lethal force may be used 
only where strictly necessary to protect against an imminent threat to life. This means 
lethal AWS should only be deployed if it is clear that, by neutralizing the target, the 
result will be proportionally better for achieving the ultimate goal of saving lives than if 
the target had not been neutralized. 
On the other hand, the ICJ addressed the question of applicability of IHRL by 
explaining that the UN Covenant’s application does not cease in wartime except for 
certain provisions, which may be subject to derogation in a time of national emergency 
(Article 4 ICCPR). However, unlike the right to privacy, freedom of movement, and the 
freedom of assembly, the right to life is not such a provision, i.e., “the right not 
arbitrarily to be deprived of one's life applies also in hostilities”130. In a conflict of laws, 
IHL would nonetheless apply as lex specialis governing the conduct of hostilities in 
armed conflicts in order to define what can be understood as “arbitrary” under Article 6 
ICCPR. Therefore, under the treaties, the question as to whether the use of autonomous 
UAVs as a means of warfare during the conduct of hostilities violates the human right 
to life must necessarily be determined by reference to the previously discussed IHL 
rules (see para. 2 of this section). At this point, it should be emphasized that not all use 
of force within an armed conflict must necessarily be considered as an “act of war” 
 
126 See Article 2, para. 1 ECHR. 
127 See Article 4, para. 2 ICCPR; Article 27, para. 2 ACHR. 
128 HEYNS, C., AKANDE, D., HILL-CAWTHRONE, L. and CHENGETA T. op. cit., note 37, p. 819.  
129 Id.  
130  Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, op. cit., note 50, para. 25. 
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governed by the law of hostilities. In its Legal Consequences of a Wall Opinion, the ICJ 
exposes three possible interaction modalities between IHL and IHRL; a) some rights 
may be exclusively governed by IHL; b) others may be exclusively matters of IHRL; c) 
yet others may be subject to both these branches of international law131. The Court 
continues by arguing that IHL continues to apply throughout the armed conflict as lex 
specialis, however, the specific rules governing the use of force outside of the conduct 
of hostilities derive primarily from human rights (case) law. In the Nicaragua132 and 
Corfu Channel133 cases, the ICJ determined the legal base of the prohibition of murder 
and extrajudicial killing of persons not engaged in military hostilities, by applying 
“elementary considerations of humanity” enshrined in Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions I-IV134. These provisions count as “general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations” within the meaning of Article 38(1)(c) of the legally binding ICJ 
Statute135. Since Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions I-IV is considered to be “even 
more exacting in peace than in war”, and to apply “at any time and in any place 
whatsoever”136, they remain binding both extraterritorially and in situations not reaching 
the threshold of an armed conflict. In conclusion, the right to life under IHRL would be 
the “default legal norm” applicable to deaths caused by autonomous drone strikes137. 
Nevertheless, the prohibition of murder and extrajudicial execution reflects a universal 
standard applicable whenever and wherever States resort to lethal force outside the 
conduct of hostilities138, e.g., it provides the legal basis for the defence of human rights 
in the use of interstate force (ius ad bellum).  
 
 
 
131 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, case nº 131, para. 106, ICJ 2004: Confirmed in; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo 
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgement, ICJ Reports, International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) 2005, para. 216. 
132 ICJ, Nicaragua v United States, op. cit. note 55, para. 218. 
133 ICJ, Corfu Channel case (United Kingdom v. Albania), Judgment of 9 April 1949 (Merits). p. 22. 
134 Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the 
Field, Geneva, 12 August 1949: Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick 
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Geneva, 12 August 1949: Convention (III) relative to 
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949: Convention (IV) relative to the Protection 
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949. 
135 United Nations, Statute of the International Court of Justice, 18 April 1946.  
136 See Article 3, para. 1 Geneva Conventions I-IV. 
137 HEYNS, C., AKANDE, D., HILL-CAWTHRONE, L. and CHENGETA T. op. cit., note 37, p. 819.  
138 MELZER, N., op. cit., note 124, pp. 18-19.  
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II. Attribution for internationally wrongful acts resulting from the State 
use of AWS. 
The previous section focused on the (reasonably) predictable violations of 
international obligations in the use of AWS as a first step in fulfilling the criteria of Article 
2 of the ILC-Articles. This section aims to specify the conditions under which said breaches 
can be attributed to the State as per the second requirement of the Draft Articles. In order 
to acquire a more complete vision of possible future cases of attribution of internationally 
wrongful acts, the relationship of international responsibility between States and 
international organizations (IO) will also be explored.  
 
 
1. General rules on attribution of internationally wrongful acts 
States are juridical abstractions that necessarily need to act through organs or 
agents. Article 4 of the ILC-Articles encompasses the actions of State organs, which can 
be attributed to the State, “whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or 
any other functions” 139 . In this sense, the rules of attribution serve the purpose of 
specifying the actors whose conduct may engage the responsibility of the State, in 
general or specific circumstances. It is not the question to determine whether certain 
officials can enter into existing international obligations of the State in the first place. 
The only State actors that have inherent authority to bind the State are senior officials 
(the head of State or government, the minister of foreign affairs, and diplomats in 
specific circumstances)140. On the other hand, other officials act upon the basis of 
express or ostensible authority pursuant to Article 46 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties (VCLT)141. Under those conditions, any State official may commit 
an internationally wrongful act attributable to the State, even at a local or municipal 
level.  
 
139 See Article 4 para. 1 ILC-Articles.  
140 CRAWFORD, J., State Responsibility: The General Part, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2013, p. 113. 
141 United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), Vienna 23 May 1969, Articles 
53-64. 
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Applied to the case at hand, this would include the actions of the armed forces 
of a State making use of an AWS (executive power)142. In an armed conflict, a soldier is 
expected to apply discretion in a humane way, e.g., in face of hors de combat143. Fully 
autonomous UAVs, on the other hand, will always pose the risk of unpredictability 
despite, for example, being alien to “genocidal thinking”144. A good functioning of 
machine learning depends on its compliance with pre-specified examples of scenarios 
that “worked” and scenarios that “did not work”, which, as previously implied, is 
crucial for the establishment of a possible breach of an international obligation [see 
section ‘[i]us in bello’, letter e)] 145 . If the scenario changes drastically, which is 
common in the course of armed conflicts, the AWS may not be able to adapt within the 
limits of international law146. In regard to attribution, specifically, commanders will 
have to include a percentage of uncertainty in their calculations when deciding to 
deploy an AWS. Alongside traditional precautionary measures, state agents should 
therefore only deploy autonomous devices if their current  military assessments 
demonstrate that the expected damage is proportionally lower than the anticipated 
military advantage (including the unpredictability factor) 147. The same would happen if 
a soldier were to deploy the AWS, since a “military commander is criminally 
responsible under the Rome Statute for crimes committed by forces under his or her 
effective command and control as a result of his or her failure to exercise control 
properly over such forces”148. This individual criminal responsibility of soldiers (State 
officials) is the responsibility that will automatically amount to committing the 
controlling State under Article 4 of the ILC-Articles. This claim is also supported by 
Article 43(1) of Protocol I, which emphasizes the subordination of armed forces groups 
to a military command under a corresponding centralized State control149. Hence, were 
a commander to use an AWS with the deliberate intention of targeting civilians and/or 
 
142 CRAWFORD, J., State Responsibility: The General Part, op. cit., note 141, pp. 118-119.  
143 ICRC, Practice Relating to Rule 47. Attacks against Persons Hors de Combat. In: IHL Database 
online.  
144 ARKIN, R. C., The Case for Ethical Autonomy in Unmanned Systems. In: Journal of Military Ethics 
online. Vol. 9, 2010 - Issue 4: Ethics and Emerging Military Technologies, pp. 332-341.  
145 Id.  
146 LARK, M., The Future of Killing: Ethical and Legal Implications of Fully Autonomous Weapon 
Systems. In: Salus Journal online. Vol. 5, Nº 1, 2017, p. 64.  
147 BOOTHBY, W., “Autonomous attack and the law”, in: Some legal challenges posed by remote attack, 
International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 94, Nº 886, 2012 p. 585. 
148 Id., p. 590. 
149 See Article 43 para. 1 Protocol I.  
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civilian objects, the result would be the commission of a war crime just as when using 
conventional weapons with a similar animus dolendi 150. Depending on the specific 
circumstances of each case, this criminal responsibility would amount to State 
responsibility, due to the aforementioned legal link between officers and the sending 
State. There is no war crime of failing to take precautions in attack, nevertheless, the 
precautionary rules of Article 57 Protocol I are largely customary and bind all States. 
The law does not exclude controllers of an autonomous UAV “because of the absence 
of a person from the cockpit”151. The report of the ICRC concludes that humans will 
always be the ones who ultimately “switch on” AWS; “that individual – and the party to 
the conflict – is responsible for the decision, however remote in time or space the 
weapon might have been deployed from the moment of the attack”152. The lack of 
precautionary measures can thus serve as an indicator of the attribution of responsibility 
of commanders for violations of IHL subsequently committed by the deployed AWS153.  
In the context of IHL, the violation of the Geneva Conventions by armed 
forces will always be attributable to and invoke the international responsibility of said 
State154. Commentary on Article 4 of the ILC-Articles expounds that such responsibility 
is unlimited, insofar as that organ acts in an official capacity155. However, as noted by 
the ICJ in the Armed Activities case, “it is irrelevant for the attribution of their conduct 
… whether the personnel acted contrary to the instructions given or exceeded their 
authority” 156 . The disobedience of instructions given by a commander (ultra vires) 
would, hence, still entail the attribution of the acts of a soldier in relation to the 
deployment of an AWS even when the forces in question are no longer under State 
command. Depending on the circumstances, it could be argued that it is unnecessary for 
an individual to act as a direct perpetrator of the internationally wrongful act. A 
precedent can be found in the Corfu Channel case, where Albania was held responsible 
 
150 See Article 8(2)(b)(i) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998.  
151 BOOTHBY, W., op. cit., note 148, p. 584.  
152  KELLENBERGER, J., International Humanitarian Law and New Weapon Technologies. In: 34th 
Round Table on Current Issues of International Humanitarian Law, San Remo, Italy, 2011, p. 816. 
153 BOOTHBY, W., op. cit., note 148, p. 590.  
154 See Article 91 Protocol I.  
155 International Law Commission, Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the work of its 
fifty-third session. In: Yearbook Of The International Law Commission. United Nations, New York and 
Geneva, 2007, pp. 40-42.  
156 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, op. cit., note 132.  
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for unlawful acts committed by an “unnamed third party” (presumably Yugoslavia) due 
to its officials’ knowledge at the time and their inaction in the face of the obvious 
danger posed by certain operations. This reflects a possible omission, which could be 
internationally wrongful (Article 2 ILC-Articles), e.g., by failing to warn of a defective 
AWS or its inherent limitations.  
Concerning ius ad bellum, if a State agent decides to make use of an 
autonomous drone (and all it entails) and violates the territorial integrity of another 
State, such conduct would be directly attributable to the State they represent. An 
example of this can be found in the Rainbow Warrior case, where France was found 
responsible for the violation of New Zealand’s national sovereignty committed by the 
French Directorate General of External Security (executive power)157. The principles of 
attribution of the law of State responsibility can help provide a basis for the scope of the 
primary obligation of States to refrain from using or threatening to use force against 
other States158. It is worth remembering the fact that the prohibition is an integral part of 
the primary source of international law – the UNC – dedicated to the maintenance of 
“International Peace and Security”159. This is particularly important in view of Article 
59 of the ILC-Articles, which states that its application will be “without prejudice to the 
Charter of the United Nations” and guarantees its concordance with Article 103 UNC 
and, hence, the mandate of the SC in virtue of Chapter VII UNC160. The fact that States 
are required to inform the SC and that the latter is the organ in charge of judging the 
necessity and proportionality of said State’s use of UAVs in self-defence inherently 
reflects the accountability of said State towards the SC. This is ultimately at the 
discretion of the SC according to the primary rules of the law of force, i.e., Chapter VII 
of the UNC. Although the attribution of inter-state force may seem obvious from the 
“state-centric” conception of Article 2(4) UNC 161 , States are ultimately corporate 
 
157 Case concerning the differences between New Zealand and France arising from the Rainbow Warrior 
affair, Arbitral Award, 74 ILR 256, Secretary-General of the United Nations 1986. 
158 NOLLKAEMPER, A., The Security Council and the Use of Force: Theory and Reality, a Need for a 
Change?, Amsterdam, Martinus Nijhoff, 2005, p. 169.  
159 See Article 1 and Chapter VII Charter of the United Nations.  
160 See Article 59 ILC-Articles.  
161 TRAPP, K. N., Actor-Pluralism, the ‘Turn to Responsibility’ and the Jus Ad Bellum: ‘Unwilling or 
Unable’ in Context. In: 2 Journal on the Use of Force and International Law, Faculty of Laws, UCL, 8 
August 2015, p. 133-171. 
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entities that inevitably need the intermediate involvement of natural persons 162 . 
“Attribution”, in the sense of the ILC-Articles, generally establishes “whether the 
conduct of a natural person or other such intermediary can be considered an act of State 
and thus be capable of giving rise to State responsibility”163. Because IHL addresses 
individuals, the attribution of the behaviour of certain persons to a State can become 
clearer. Nevertheless, the general rules also apply to the ius ad bellum, in case 
individuals covered by the ILC-Articles conduct the illegitimate use of force. 
Outside the conduct of military hostilities, the idea that the law of State 
responsibility and IHRL are mutually reinforcing has been widely recognized by 
international human rights bodies164. As with the other substantive law bodies, when a 
State violates its human rights obligations pursuant to subscribed human rights treaties, 
State responsibility is established “as immediately as between the two [or more] 
States”165. This translates into the emergence of State responsibility as an automatically 
arising consequence of the breach of IHRL by State organs – irrespective of whether or 
not a victim seeks a remedy for the damage or harm suffered. The right to life, 
concretely, is often described as the “supreme right” as certain violations thereof may 
also lead to individual responsibility for the commission of war crimes or crimes against 
humanity166 An example of the application of Article 4 of the ILC-Articles can be seen 
in cases where the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) attributed violations of the 
ICCPR to central governments, municipal authorities, police and security forces and 
several types of State organs167. IHRL is legally binding for States to the extent that 
 
162 CRAWFORD, J., State Responsibility: The General Part, op. cit., note 141, p. 113.  
163 Id.  
164 Humberto Menanteau Aceituno and Mr. José Carrasco Vasquez (represented by counsel Mr. Nelson 
Caucoto Pereira of the Fundación de Ayuda Social de las Iglesias Cristianas) v. Chile, Communication 
No. 746/1997, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/66/C/746/1997, para. 5.4, Human Rights Committee (HRC) 1999: 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), Alejandre et al. v. Cuba, case No. 11.589, 
Report No. 86/99, paras. 37, 45, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) 1999: European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR), Bankovic and others v. Belgium and 16 other Contracting States, 
Application No. 52207/99, Admissibility Decision, paras. 74-76, European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR) 2001.  
165 Phosphates in Morocco (Italy v France), General List No. 71, Judgment No. 28, para. 48, ICJ 1938. 
166 UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), General Comment No. 6: Article 6 (Right to Life), 1982, para. 
1. 
167  WEWERINKE-SINGH, M., “State Responsibility for Human Rights Violations Associated with 
Climate Change”, in DUYCK, S., JODOIN, S. and JOHL, A. (eds.), Handbook on Human Rights and 
Climate Governance, Leiden, Routledge, 2017, p. 5.  
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their agents “exercise physical power, authority or control over individuals”168. This 
further reinforces that violations of the right to life should be attributed to those 
commanders or officials who decide to use autonomous UAVs outside of an armed 
conflict irrespective of territorial considerations. As such, IHRL becomes the “default 
legal norm” for the protection of AWS strike victims169. However, it must be admitted 
that few human rights cases have suggested that a State’s human rights obligations may 
be violated through the extraterritorial use of military force regardless of personal 
custody, which could be particularly relevant for cross-border AWS strikes170.  
In general terms, a State is not responsible for the acts of private individuals 
unless it is exercising effective control over such actors (Article 8 ILC-Articles)171 or 
ratifies their acts as its own (Article 11 ILC-Articles)172. The ICJ has often applied a 
strict “effective control test” under Article 8 ILC-Articles by reducing it to the cases 
where the State was in “direction or control [of] the specific operation and the conduct 
complained of was an integral part of that operation”173. It has to be a significant level 
of control, reflected, inter alia, in the dependence of the individual(s) to the State, and 
the State “direction or enforcement” of the former to achieve an operational 
objective174. This happens if, e.g., commanders recruit and train private actors to deploy 
UAVs within a State-led operation. Said training could be crucial to carry out a State-
led operation that may result in civilian losses, especially if just a few States own the 
required technology. If the individuals infringe IHL rules during the course of said 
operation, the ‘controlling’ State could be held responsible for the breach of its 
international obligations175. After all, the raison d’être of the ILC-Articles is to prevent 
States from hiding unlawful practices behind unofficial forces.   
 
 
2. State organs and international organizations 
 
168 MELZER, N., op. cit., note 124, p. 17. 
169 HEYNS, C., AKANDE, D., HILL-CAWTHORNE, L. and CHENGETA, T., op. cit., note 37, p. 819. 
170 MELZER, N., op. cit., note 124, p. 17. 
171 CRAWFORD, J. and OLLESON, S., “The Nature and Forms of International Responsibility”. In: 
Malcolm D. Evans, International Law, 5th. ed., Great Britain, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 457.  
172 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgement, p. 3, paras. 73-74, CJ 1980.  
173 Yearbook Of The International Law Commission, op. cit., note 156, p. 47.  
174 ICJ, Nicaragua v United States, op. cit. note 55, p. 51, para. 86.  
175 Yearbook Of The International Law Commission, op. cit., note 174. 
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It is worthwhile to contrast the responsibility regime applicable to the organs of 
State by virtue of Article 4 ILC-Articles with the law of International Organizations of 
which these States are a member. This is due to the potential future relevance of IOs, such 
as the UN or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the field of AWS, which, like 
States, cannot carry out their activities without the intermediate participation of natural 
persons. These persons may sometimes be part of the IO’s staff, but it is not unusual for 
such entities to “borrow” the organs of one or several of its contributing MS176. The ILC-
Articles do not provide a definition of the relationship of international responsibility 
between States and IOs, but it does mention; “[the] articles are without prejudice to any 
question of the responsibility under international law of an international organization, or 
of any State for the conduct of an international organization”177. The controversial nature 
of the issue - as it indirectly questions the reliability and proper functioning of IOs – lead 
to the Commission’s decision to refer these questions to its 2011 Draft Articles on the 
Responsibility of International Organizations (DARIO)178. Like the ILC-Articles on State 
responsibility, the DARIO does not in principle address primary rules, which determine 
whether an IO is bound to a specific international obligation, rather it provides the 
secondary legal basis for establishing the consequences of the breach of the obligations 
they pledged to fulfil179. In order to delimit the scope of the Draft, DARIO Article 2 defines 
international organizations as those entities “possessing [their] own [separate] 
international legal personality”, which implies that the IOs’ acts may not automatically 
give rise to responsibility of their MS and vice versa180. In order to identify the difference 
between the State’s responsibility and that of IOs, prominent international jurisprudence 
resorts to the standard of ‘effective control’ pursuant to DARIO Article 7, which has 
evolved from its first use in the Nicaragua case (see para. 1 of this section)181. The DARIO 
Commentary of Article 7 states that the criterion for attribution of conduct focuses “on the 
factual control that is exercised over the specific conduct taken by the organ or agent 
 
176 CRAWFORD, J., State Responsibility: The General Part, op. cit., note 141, pp. 188-189.  
177 See Article 57 ILC-Articles.  
178 ILC, Draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations (DARIO), 2011. Adopted by 
the International Law Commission at its sixty-third session, in 2011, andsubmitted to the General 
Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report covering the work of that session (A/66/10, para. 87). 
179 GAJA, G., Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations. In: Audiovisual Library of 
International Law [online]. New York: United Nations, Law of International Relations, 9 December 
2011. 
180 See Article 2 (a) DARIO.  
181 ICJ, Nicaragua v United States, op. cit. note 55.  
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placed at the receiving organization’s disposal”182. As demonstrated in the Al-Jedda v. the 
United Kingdom case before the ECHR, where the UN was found not to be responsible for 
the acts of the ‘Multi-National Force’, formed by the UK and the US, in Iraq183. Even though 
the US had been asked to periodically report the UNSC about their activities, “the United 
Nations did not, thereby, assume any degree of control over either the force or any other 
of the executive functions of the Coalition Provisional Authority”184. However, regarding 
the application of DARIO Article 7, it is equally true that responsibility may be jointly 
attributed to both States and IOs; “dual or even multiple attribution of conduct cannot be 
excluded”185. In this sense, the attribution of certain behaviour to an IO does not 
necessarily preclude the attribution of the same conduct to a MS and vice-versa. If conduct 
was originally attributed to a MS, in principle, nothing prevents the same conduct being 
attributed to the IO186. The crux of this reasoning is the concept of actual and positive 
control over the acts in question based on the agreed upon relationship of authority and 
command between MS and the specific IO. This goes beyond the unrefined question, "who 
gave the orders?"187. Instead, it focuses on the “command and control authority and 
responsibility with which the entity was endowed” and analyses the de facto actions in 
order to find out which of the two entities – the IO or the MS – was positioned to have 
acted differently in the specific context in a way that would have avoided the alleged 
misconduct188. In the ‘Nuhanović and Mustafić v. Netherlands cases (Dutchbat)189, the 
Dutch Court of Appeal stated that the level of influence of a MS (in this case; Netherlands) 
over its peacekeepers can be a strong indicator of its position of effective control over the 
actions of said personnel, and more specifically, the MS could have used said effective 
control to prevent international law violations from happening. This decision was based 
on the rationale that acts should be attributed to the MS or IO that is best (legally) 
positioned to prevent them. In the case where a UAV caused civilian losses within the 
scope of a peacekeeping mission led by an international organization, the legal control of 
 
182 ILC, Draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations, with commentaries, 2011, 
Article 7, para. 4.  
183 Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Application no. 
27021/08, Judgement, Strasbourg, 7 July 2011. 
184 Id., para. 80.  
185 ILC, Draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations, with commentaries, op. cit., 
note 179, Chapter II, para. 4.  
186 Id.  
187 CRAWFORD, J., State Responsibility: The General Part, op. cit., note 141, pp. 190-191.  
188 Id. 
189  Nuhanović v. The Netherlands, ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2011:BR5388, 200.020.174/01, GHSGR 2011: 
Mustafić-Mujić et al v. The Netherlands, ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2011:BR5386, 200.020.173/01, para. 3.10.2, 
Gerechtshof 's-Gravenhage (GHSGR) 2011. 
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M.U. EN DIPLOMACIA Y ORGANIZACIONES INTERNACIONALES 
 
 
 35 
the contributing MS over its personnel at the time of the alleged infringement should first 
be examined. This will determine its capacity to prevent internationally wrongful acts 
from occurring (DARIO Article 7).  Despite being an area undergoing continuous 
development, the general intention of predominant international jurisprudence is notable. 
Specifically, it aims to prevent States from hiding behind international organizations to 
commit internationally wrongful acts. This reasoning has been gaining importance 
primarily in tackling possible cases of MS impunity, but it has also opened the possibility 
of attribution of internationally wrongful acts to IOs in a centralized manner, or as 
multiple responsibility encompassing both separate entities190.  
 
 
III. Responsibility for breaches of collective obligations 
As has been briefly mentioned throughout this thesis, all three analysed 
substantive international law corpuses –ius ad bellum191, IHL and IHRL – entail, what the 
ILC-Articles define as collective obligations – also referred to as obligations erga omnes192. 
These types of international obligation are characterized by the fact that they are due to all 
recipient States of such obligations, whether a limited group of States or the entire 
international community as a whole193. These are obligations that, in principle, cannot be 
subdivided into several bilateral relations, but rather are obligations of a communitarian 
nature. Furthermore, its compliance does not depend on the compliance of other States, 
since there is no reciprocity to achieve the objectives set by either multilateral treaties or 
by general international law194. However, as will be seen below, its non-compliance 
produces specific legal effects both for given groups of States and/or for the international 
community as a whole, depending on the type and origin of the breached obligation. 
 
 
1. Invocation of responsibility for the breach of obligations erga omnes and 
erga omnes partes 
 
190 BOON, K. E., Supreme Court Decision Rendered in Dutchbat Case: the Netherlands Responsible. In: 
Opinio Juris [online]. [USA]: 6 September 2013.  
191 International Law Commission, Report on the work of the seventy-first session (A/74/10), 2019, pp. 
173-177.   
192 Yearbook Of The International Law Commission, op. cit., note 156, p. 118, para 11.  
193 CASANOVAS, O., “Obligaciones de Estructura Integral”, in: CASANOVAS, O. and RODRIGO, A. 
J. (eds.), Compendio de Derecho Internacional Público, Madrid, Editorial Tecnos, 2019, pp. 60-62.  
194 Id.  
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It has to be noted that, as of today, no complete agreement has been reached on 
the enumeration of communitarian norms, since this area of international law is still 
developing. Nevertheless, it has been long accepted that States should have standing to 
protest breaches of certain fundamental norms, and should also, if necessary, be entitled 
to initiate legal proceedings in that respect195. Article 48 of the ILC-Articles provides 
the legal coverage inherited from the Barcelona Traction case for such actions by 
stating that “[a]ny State other than an injured State is entitled to invoke the 
responsibility of another State”196. This is the case if the following non-cumulative 
conditions exist; a) the obligation breached has its origin in a multilateral treaty between 
a group of States – among which is the complaining State – and said obligation was 
established to protect a collective interest of the group (obligations erga omnes 
partes)197; or b) “the obligation breached is owed to the international community as a 
whole” (obligations erga omnes)198.  This provision is in concordance with Article 42 of 
the Draft Articles about the “[i]nvocation of responsibility by an injured State” 199 . 
Hence, in the case of obligations erga omnes partes every State party to a multilateral 
treaty has a procedural right to invoke responsibility on behalf of all other State parties, 
whereas obligations erga omnes enables every State to invoke responsibility on behalf 
of the international community as a whole.  
In the case of the ius ad bellum, the ban on the use of force in Article 2(4) 
UNC, which reflects the prohibition of aggression, is certainly one of the provisions that 
is most widely accepted and recognized as belonging to the universally binding norms 
of ius cogens that generate obligations erga omnes200. On the one hand, this is due to the 
universality of the Charter, which already reflects unanimity among States in 
recognising and treating the norm of general international law as a peremptory norm 
from which no derogation is permitted. On the other hand, it reflects and protects 
fundamental values of the international community, which are hierarchically superior to 
 
195 CRAWFORD, J., State Responsibility: The General Part, op. cit., note 141, pp. 362-375.  
196 See Article 48, para. 1 ILC-Articles: Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power 
Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), ICJ 1964. 
197 See Article 48, para. 1 (a) ILC-Articles.  
198 See Article 48, para. 1 (b) ILC-Articles.  
199 See Article 42 (b) ILC-Articles.  
200 DOMINICÉ, C., ‘The International Responsibility of States for Breach of Multilateral Obligations’. 
In: EJIL, 1999, Vol. 10 Nº 2, pp. 353–363, p. 355: Yearbook Of The International Law Commission, op. 
cit., note 162, para. (5) of the commentary to Article 26, p. 85. 
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other rules of international law, i.e. the principle of equal sovereignty of States 201 
serving the broader purpose of the ‘maintenance of international peace and security 
(Article 1.1 UNC) 202.  
Treaty systems for Human Rights protection are also among the most typical 
examples of binding peremptory norms. The right to life concretely, is considered the 
most fundamental human right and “is recognized as forming part of ius cogens and 
entailing, on the part of States, obligations erga omnes toward the international 
community as a whole”203. The aspiration towards universality in the protection of 
Human Rights is reflected in Article 1 of the UNC; “promoting and encouraging respect 
for human rights and for fundamental freedoms”204; and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights by stating that “[e]veryone is entitled to all the rights and 
freedoms…without distinction of any kind”205. On a regional level, it can be seen how 
the conception, legalisation and guarantee of Human Rights may vary between the 
European system, the inter-American system and the African system206. Nevertheless, 
the ACHR and the ECHR for example, were conceived to complement and specify the 
rights contained in the universal treaties, creating corresponding obligations erga omnes 
partes among the group of contracting MS; fostering compatibility between universality 
and regionalization and conferring greater protection (although sometimes redundant) of 
the human person regardless of nationality207. 
Contemporary IHL was prompted by the progressive process of humanization 
 
201 See Article 1, para. 2 Charter of the United Nations.  
202 Report of the International Law Commission on its Seventy-first session, 29 April–7 June and 8 July–
9 August 2019. In:  General Assembly Official Records, Supplement Nº 10 (A/74/10), Chapter IV, p. 
142: See Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention: ICJ, (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), 
op. cit., note 132, p. 168: ICJ, Nicaragua v United States, op. cit. note 55, p. 14.  
203 RIBERO, A.V., Report on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, 1987, (E/CN.4/1987/35). 
204 See Article 1, para. 4 Charter of the United Nations.  
205 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, op. cit., note 123, Art. 2.   
206 See Article 1 ECHR; Article 2, para. 1 ICCPR; Article 1, para. 1 ACHR. The only exception is the 
African Charter, which establishes an unlimited obligation of the contracting states to “recognize” and to 
“adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to” the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in the 
Charter, Article 1 African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR). 
207 SERRANO, S. and VÁZQUEZ, D., “Fundamentos teóricos de los derechos humanos. Carácterísticas 
y principios”, in: MEDELLÍN URQUIAGA, X. M., FAJARDO MORALES, Z. A., SERRANO, S., 
RAMÍREZ DAGIO, R., ROSALES ZARCO, H., BURGOS MATAMOROS, M., VÁZQUEZ, D. and 
FLORES LLANOS, F. U. (eds.), Fundamentos Teóricos de los derechos humanos, Mexico D.F., 
Comisión de Derechos Humanos del Distrito Federal, 2011, p. 224. 
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of international law marked by the adoption of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, further 
developed by Protocol I, which are applicable as a matter of customary international 
law irrespective of reciprocity 208 . Special Rapporteur Crawford states that “the 
humanitarian norms under the Geneva Conventions are characterized as erga omnes 
partes”209, however, there is some general disparity to be observed in State practice and 
international jurisprudence regarding the type of obligations derived from IHL-treaties. 
According to common Article 1 of the 1959 Geneva Conventions; “[t]he High 
Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect” for the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions “in all circumstances”. This provision –read with Protocol I –is envisaged 
to be part of customary law210, which, according to some scholars, asserts that the 1949 
Geneva Conventions embody both erga omnes and erga omnes partes obligations 
simultaneously211. This interpretation was seconded in the Wall opinion, where the ICJ 
highlighted the consequences of Israeli violations of certain obligations erga omnes by 
invoking Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions212. Stating thus that all States have 
a legal interest in other States’ compliance with the rules enshrined in the conventions 
beyond a stricto sensu regime of reciprocity. Furthermore, in its advisory opinion on the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the ICJ decided that “because a great 
many rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict are so fundamental to the 
respect of the human person and ‘elementary considerations of humanity’... they 
constitute intransgressible principles of international customary law”213. On the other 
hand, in the DRC v. Uganda, Judge Simma invoked Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions in his Separate Opinion to assert that every State party to IHL Conventions 
 
208 LONGOBARDO, M., The Contribution of International Humanitarian Law to the Development of the 
Law of International Responsibility Regarding Obligations Erga Omnes and Erga Omnes Partes. In: 
Journal of Conflict and Security Law, [online]. [United Kingdom]: University of Westminster, Nº 23, 
2018, p. 11. 
209 CRAWFORD, J., State Responsibility: The General Part, op. cit., note 141,  p. 378-380.  
210 See Article 1, para. 1 Protocol I: DOSWALD-BECK, L. and HENCKAERTS, J. M., “Chapter 41, 
Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law”, in: DOSWALD-BECK, L. and HENCKAERTS, J. M. 
(eds.), Customary International Humanitarian Law , Vol. 1:Rules, Cambridge, International Committee 
of the Red Cross, 2005, p. 509.  
211 LONGOBARDO, M., op. cit., note 209, p. 12.  
212 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, op. cit., note 
132, Nº 29, paras. 158-159.   
213 Id.  
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can make a claim before the ICJ214. This affirmed the ICJ’s jurisdiction on obligations 
erga omnes partes and was subsequently reaffirmed by the ICJ in the Belgium v. 
Senegal case215.   
This demonstrates that States making use of AWS for military purposes will 
have to keep two possible scenarios in mind: 1) said devices will necessarily be 
involved in controversies about the possible violation of principles of international law 
reflected in the three branches of international law examined in this paper, and 2) the 
State parties to the treaty that contains said basic rules and/or all States that conform the 
international community, if applicable, may invoke responsibility of those States  for 
damages caused by AWS under the supervision of their military personnel. Regardless 
of whether obligations are considered as erga omnes or erga omnes partes, the 
invocation of responsibility for damages derived from UAV strikes may be carried out 
by countries other than the directly injured State216, in defence of collective interests, 
such as international peace and security, territorial sovereignty of States, and the 
defence of Human Rights; both within and outside of armed conflicts. 
 
 
2. Serious breaches of obligations under peremptory norms 
The fact that the ius ad bellum, ius in bello and IHRL contain rules of ius 
cogens217 may lead to the application of a specific regime of aggravated responsibility; 
if States commit serious breaches of erga omnes obligations under peremptory norms 
(Part Two, Chapter III of the ILC-Articles). At this point it is convenient to remember 
that, while every ius cogens norm produces obligations erga omnes, not every 
obligation erga omnes is a norm of ius cogens. In this sense, peremptory law limits 
itself to designating the hierarchy between rules, while the concept of obligations erga 
omnes (as mentioned above) primarily aims to identify the corresponding holders of the 
 
214 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), op. 
cit., note 132, pp. 168, 242, International Court of Justice (ICJ) 2005, Separate Opinion of Judge Simma, 
para 37. 
215 ICJ, Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal) (Judgment), 
2012, ICJ Reports, Section II.  
216 See Article 42 (b) ILC-Articles. 
217 International Law Commission, Report on the work of the seventy-first session (A/74/10), 2019, p. 
147.  
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involved legal interests, i.e. a group of States or the international community as a 
whole218. This differentiation is important in order to determine the legal effects of the 
hierarchically superior peremptory norms regarding the validity and termination of 
other international treaties, which, according to Article 53 of the VCLT will inevitably 
lead to the voiding of those treaties that conflict with the given ius cogens norm219. For 
the aggravated regime of responsibility to apply, the first qualitative criterion must be 
met; there must be a violation of a peremptory norm of general international law 
(Article 40(1) ILC-Articles). In the case at hand, this would entail the prohibition of 
certain behaviours that pose a threat to international peace, human life, physical 
integrity, and dignity of peoples and individuals. The second criterion is of a 
quantitative nature; the violation has to be grave (Article 40(2) ILC-Articles).  The 
qualitative “seriousness” of the breach is achieved if the State flagrantly or 
systematically jeopardizes the most basic values protected by the peremptory norm in 
question220. The Commission was nevertheless rigorous in refraining from giving any 
indication that could imply the applicability of one single regime of responsibility for 
all serious internationally wrongful acts221: “international wrongs assume a multitude of 
forms and the consequences they should entail in terms of international responsibility 
are certainly not reducible to one or two uniform provisions”222. The Draft Articles 
leave the question open and merely indicate that the legal consequences provided for by 
Chapter III will apply “without prejudice to the other consequences” provided by the 
ILC-Articles in ‘Part Two’ and the specific applicable rules of international law, i.e. ius 
ad bellum, the law of armed conflict and IHRL 223 . The ILC thus leaves open the 
possibility for a particular rule to prescribe its own special consequences in the event of 
a breach. This is particularly true for the attributed consequences of the illegitimate use 
 
218 LONGOBARDO, M., op. cit., note 209, p. 5. 
219  See Articles 53-64 VCLT.  
220 CASANOVAS, O., “Las Violaciones Graves de Obligaciones Derivadas de Normas Imperativas de 
Derecho Internacional General”, in: CASANOVAS, O. and RODRIGO, A. J. (eds.), Compendio de 
Derecho Internacional Público, Madrid, Editorial Tecnos, 2019, pp. 559- 561.  
221  CRAWFORD, J., State Responsibility. In: First report on State responsibility, by Mr. James 
Crawford, Special Rapporteur, 24 April, 1, 5, 11 and 26 May, 22 and 24 July, 12 August 1998 
(A/CN.4/490 and Add. 1-7), p. 17, para. 67.  
222 International Law Commission, Documents of the twenty-eighth session (excluding the report of the 
Commission to the General Assembly). In: Yearbook Of The International Law Commission, Vol. II, Part 
one, A/CN.4/SER.A/1976/Add.l (Part 1). United Nations, New York and Geneva, 1976, p. 117, para. 53 
of the commentary to article 19.  
223 See Article 41, para. 3 ILC-Articles.  
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of inter-State force pursuant to Article 2(4) and Chapter VII of the UNC (see section II. 
1)224. Hence, if there is no other applicable norm, the general consequence that the Draft 
Articles foresee is the abandonment of sanctioning conceptions beyond the provided 
general consequences related to the responsible State, i.e. Cessation and non-repetition 
[Article 30 a)] and reparation (Article 31) 225 . Inspired by the general objective of 
encouraging States to fulfil their international obligations, the consequences foreseen in 
this aggravated regime of responsibility – so-called “obligations of solidarity” – are 
addressed rather to the other States of the international community226.  
If an AWS commits a serious breach of one of the previously analysed 
peremptory norms within the ius ad bellum, IHL and IHRL, it is therefore to be 
expected that the rest of the international community adopts a specific conduct towards 
the State whose armed forces were in control of said device227. There is an obligation of 
a positive nature imposed on the other States, to actively put an end, by lawful means, to 
the serious violations of obligations erga omnes; whereas, from a negative perspective, 
States will have to refrain from recognizing the resulting situation as lawful228.  
 
 
IV. The role of international judicial bodies  
The invocation of international responsibility within the aggravated responsibility regime 
obeys, in principle, the same requirements as in the general regime. These are; the 
presentation of a claim directly against another State or through the initiation of 
proceedings before an international tribunal; the duty to notify the claim to the 
responsible State (Article 43.1 ILC-Articles); and the possibility for legitimized States – the 
injured State, State parties to a treaty other that the injured State or the international 
community as a whole229 – to specify the behaviour that the responsible State should 
observe to put an end to the wrongful act, if it continues, as well as the determination of 
 
224 See Articles 55 and 59 ILC-Articles.  
225 See Part Two, Chapter I (“General Principles”) ILC-Articles.  
226 CASANOVAS, O., “Las Violaciones Graves de Obligaciones Derivadas de Normas Imperativas de 
Derecho Internacional General”, op. cit., note 221, p. 563.  
227 See Article 41, para. 1 ILC-Articles.  
228 See Article 41, para. 2 ILC-Articles.  
229 See Article 42 ILC-Articles.  
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the corresponding reparation (Article 43.2 ILC-Articles)230. Hence, for the offending State 
to be held liable for violations of international law committed by its AWSs, there must be a 
forum to which it answers and through which legitimized States or individual victims 
themselves may challenge said behaviour. Whether the ICJ could be the forum for AWS-
related interstate disputes constitutes the focus of this section. 
Although the ICJ is not the only international tribunal for the resolution of 
inter-state disputes, other international bodies will not be investigated here. In the case 
of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Dispute Settlement Body, this is because it 
primarily focuses on trade-related disagreements, thus leaving disputes over AWS 
crimes, such as human rights violations or the breach of IHL-rules, outside their 
jurisdiction231. The International Criminal Court only has jurisdiction over individuals, 
which would deviate from the object of study of this paper232. The ICJ on the other 
hand, primarily focuses on the dispute settlement between States, making it thus the 
theoretically ideal forum to entertain AWS-related legal controversies between the 
alleged offending State and other States on behalf of their citizens affected by State-led 
AWS strikes, or on behalf of the entire international community. However, the 
enforceability of State responsibility for internationally wrongful acts committed by 
AWS could be hampered if both parties have not given their consent for the Court’s 
authority. This consent can be expressed through an international agreement containing 
a specific provision that enables them to resort to the ICJ for the settlement of disputes. 
Other ways to give consent to ICJ adjudication include the formal acceptance of the 
Court’s jurisdiction as mandatory when confronting another UN MS via a declaration 
with the Secretary General and the signing of a separate agreement to submit an existing 
dispute to the ICJ. According to Hammond, these mechanisms could face some 
difficulties when dealing with AWS crimes, since the main treaties that contain the legal 
basis for IHL or IHRL violations “do not require dispute resolution in the ICJ”233. It has 
to be noted that these obstacles are nevertheless not to be attributed to the AI 
 
230 CASANOVAS, O., “Las Violaciones Graves de Obligaciones Derivadas de Normas Imperativas de 
Derecho Internacional General”, op. cit., note 221, pp. 561-562.  
231 World Trade Organization, Understanding On Rules And Procedures Governing The Settlement Of 
Disputes (DSU), Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement.  
232 ICJ, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, in force on 1 July 2002, United 
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2187, Nº 38544, Article 25.   
233 HAMMOND, D. N., ‘Autonomous Weapons and the Problem of State Accountability’. In: Chicago 
Journal of International Law [online]. [United States] : 2015; 15, 2; ProQuest, Vol. 15, Nº 2, p. 679.  
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phenomenon per se, but this is a limitation that is inherent to the major IHL and IHRL 
Conventions, which explains why the ICJ has only rendered few decisions regarding 
IHL234. The conclusions to be drawn from this are; a) the ICJ’s mandate would cover 
ratio materiae disputes between States for the commission of internationally wrongful 
acts by AWS; b) whether the case will actually go to court will depend largely on the 
proactive attitude of States in regards to the international jurisdiction of the ICJ. States 
are very likely to be reluctant to freely submit disputes to the Court, however, as has 
been seen in ICJ case law on IHL and IHRL235, those cases where the Court does rule 
could be vital for the substantive development of international law in response to new 
challenges posed by AWS.  
 
 
D. Conclusion  
 
The applicability of the ILC-Articles to internationally wrongful acts resulting 
from the State use of AWS has been proven by the present study; however, the intricacy 
of this type of legal operation should not be underestimated, as there is a general lack of 
legal provisions that specifically address AI. Social reality being more advanced than 
international regulations is nothing new; Law, in general, has had to adopt a rather 
reactive approach to the great changes and events within the international system. 
Examples of this approach can be seen with the development of nuclear weapons, the 
growing threat posed by non-state actors, cyberspace etc.. It could thus be argued that 
AI is nothing more than the next inevitable step in a race for more sophisticated warfare 
technology, which will have to be addressed by existing or, perhaps, future specific 
international law provisions. The ILC-Articles, although considered part of soft-law, 
acquire great relevance as one of the most complete compilations of general 
international law specifically addressing the establishment and consequences of State 
responsibility for the breach of its international obligations.   
 
234 Id., p. 678.  
235 CHETAIL, V., ‘The Contribution of the International Court of Justice to International Humanitarian 
Law’. In: International Review of the Red Cross (IRRC), 2003, Vol. 85, Nº 850, pp. 267-268.  
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The reason behind the resort to this particular responsibility regime for 
internationally wrongful acts committed by AWS is twofold; firstly, the cutting-edge 
technology discussed in this paper is surprisingly unknown outside the technology-
development circles of most advanced countries. Secondly, the complexity of these 
autonomous systems requires the intervention of various actors, whether in their 
manufacture, commercialization or inclusion in military operations, which may result in 
ambiguities regarding the attribution of responsibility. In regards to the former, at the 
end of the day, the step towards autonomy of AI systems continues to be a project under 
study where great secrecy reigns. In this sense, it is still too early to be able to reach 
exact conclusions about the level of autonomy that these systems will really possess and 
the associated problems that will have to be addressed by international legislators. 
Based on this unavoidable unknown, the guidelines of the ILC-Articles become very 
convenient because they focus on a sufficiently well-known international actor, the 
State, rather than on specific weapons of which sufficient, precise information is not yet 
available. That will be the duty of specific laws on artificial intelligence as means of 
force. The second reason behind the application of the ILC-Articles to the case at hand 
is one in line with some AWS-sceptics; the chain of interveners in the development and 
use of autonomous systems is too long to be able to establish a single comprehensive 
system of responsibility adjudication between, e.g. software programmers, military 
personnel, weapons reviewers, and political leaders. Although this fact does not imply 
that such a legal system may not be developed in the future, what is certain is that this 
system does not yet exist in relation to AWS crimes. The intrinsic complexity of AI 
systems and the multitude of individuals involved in their use requires a centralised 
State responsibility for violations of international obligations by its state forces in order 
to avoid the infamous ‘accountability gap’. 
Throughout this thesis, some of the possible weaknesses of AWS have been 
detected; autonomous UAVs will inevitably be involved in international law 
controversies due to the limitations inherent in any AI system that aims to deal with 
situations as unpredictable as armed conflicts, where any miscalculation can lead to 
multiple civilian casualties or serious property damage. Assuming there is no point in 
blaming artificial devices, it can be concluded that only human beings are subject to 
legal rules. The behaviour of individuals still remains a crucial factor for the application 
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of the ILC-Articles for violations of ius ad bellum, ius in bello and IHRL; either through 
the revision of new weapons, the adoption of precautionary measures, or of decisions of 
the SC. The final decision as to whether an AWS is actually used in a specific operation 
remains with human beings, especially, military officials in charge of developing 
operational plans. In this sense, when weighing the possible collateral damages against 
the benefits of continuing with an operation, the unpredictability factor applicable to 
devices that "think" on their own should be included. From the opposite point of view, 
the use of robots must be in accordance with the inevitable limitations of the human 
being when trying to trace the decision-making processes that the robot goes through in 
its attempt to respond to external stimuli on the battlefield. 
Given that in the cases analysed, interests and values essential to the 
international community are being dealt with, it can be concluded that the violation of 
rules contained in the three substantial international law corpuses could probably 
amount to serious breaches of peremptory norms of general international law pursuant 
to the ILC-Articles. This regime of aggravated responsibility, far from imposing greater 
penalties recalls the power conferred on the international community as an element of 
exerting pressure on those States that are in breach of erga omnes or erga omnes partes 
obligations. Considering the difference in opinions between countries in relation to 
AWS, it could be the case that some States (especially European) exert said pressure 
against States that do possess such a level of AI in their military arsenals. 
Hence, AWSs’ lack of humanity does not per se cause a responsibility void as 
long as they are treated as what they are: a weapon whose use depends on a human 
decision. AWS are not intrinsically lethal, however, they will have to be used by States 
under the constant supervision of its organs and with multiple precautionary measures 
in order to assess the inevitable unpredictability of robots and avoid breaches of 
international obligations of States whether acting alone or as a MS of an international 
organization.  
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